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1 Introduction
Developed economies with similar economic fundamentals display a sustained disparity in
public indebtedness. According to OECD data,1 the average debt-to-GDP ratio over the period
1991-2007 was below 20% in Australia, around 60% in Germany, France, and the United States,
whereas Belgium, Italy and Japan showed ratios above 100%. Moreover, some countries have
experienced prolonged periods of low levels of public debt followed by prolonged periods of high
public debt. Can these observations be accounted for as the outcome of the government's welfare
maximization problem in a standard, o-the-shelf neoclassical model of capital accumulation?
The present paper explores this question. We consider a simple model economy with three
types of agents: rms, households, and a benevolent government. Firms are perfectly competitive;
they hire physical capital and labor from households to produce a homogeneous good with a
constant-returns-to-scale technology. Households enjoy consumption of a private good and of
a government-provided, public good; they save in physical capital and government debt. The
government decides on the level of spending in the public consumption good, on a uniform tax
rate on labor income and asset returns, and on the issuance of public debt. The government
lacks commitment to future policy choices and thus makes decisions sequentially. Specically, we
characterize optimal time-consistent scal policy in dierentiable Markov-perfect equilibrium.
The main contribution of our analysis can be summarized as follows. In the class of economies
outlined above, there exists a continuous multiplicity of Markov-perfect equilibrium policy rules,
which in turn generate a multiplicity of steady-state values for allocations, prices and scal policy
variables. The set of Markov-perfect equilibria includes the Ramsey equilibrium, which yields no
distortionary taxation and negative debt in the long-run, as well as policy rules that generate
positive levels of taxes and debt in the long run. For example, there exists a Markov-perfect
equilibrium that features a steady-state income tax rate of 19% and a debt-GDP ratio of 56%
under a standard calibration of parameter values.
Equilibrium multiplicity in our model is of the expectation trap type: households' actions,
which are based on their scal policy expectations, condition the government's decision problem in
a way such that it becomes optimal for the government to fulll these expectations. That is, there
is a dynamic complementarity between the decisions of households and the scal authority, which
can render the expectation of positive taxes and debt self-fullling. We identify two properties of
1See the OEDC's Economic Outlook.
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the equilibrium consumption function that are key to the multiplicity result: (i) households do
not use information on the current income tax rate to pin down consumption, and (ii) public debt
is not net wealth for the household sector. Private consumption is thus solely determined by the
stock of physical capital and by expectations on current debt issuance and future scal policy.
This has two important implications for the government when setting scal policy in a given time
period. First, current income taxation is perceived as non-distortionary by the government, as not
only distortions on past investment are overlooked but also current consumption is unaected by
taxes. Second, the continuation value of the current government does not depend on current debt
issuance. This leads to a redundancy of policy instruments, as income taxation and debt issuance
aect all trade-os involved in the government's maximization problem equally. Equilibrium
multiplicity follows directly from this redundancy, and is therefore generic in our environment (i.e.,
multiplicity does not depend on particular choices for the model's parameter values). We explain
the underlying mechanism in greater detail below, exploring rst a simple model economy that
allows for closed-form solutions to the equilibrium policy functions. Finally, we use computational
methods to show that our main ndings hold also in the more general setup.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper to show a generic, expectations-driven
multiplicity of optimal discretionary scal policy in a standard, neoclassical economy. In models
of optimal monetary policy under discretion, equilibrium multiplicity has recently been docu-
mented in several contributions. Albanesi et al. (2003) provide a theory based on expectation
traps to account for the behavior of post-war US ination. King and Wolman (2004) study discre-
tionary monetary policy in a non-linear model with staggered prices; they show that a dynamic
complementarity between the rms' pricing decision and the policy maker's money supply deci-
sion gives rise to two equilibria, one with high ination and one with low ination. Blake and
Kirsanova (2012) show multiplicity of discretionary equilibria in linear-quadratic New-Keynesian
economies. Specically, they present an economy with capital accumulation (but without govern-
ment debt) in which dynamic complementarities within the private sector can lead to equilibrium
multiplicity, i.e., there can be countably many dierent private sector responses to a given policy
decision.2 By contrast, in our environment there generically arises a continuous multiplicity, due
to a dynamic complementarity between the households' consumption-savings decision and the
optimal scal policy set by the government.
2They also discuss an economy with government debt (but without capital) where the monetary authority
minimizes a quadratic loss function while a scal authority employs a xed, non-optimizing policy rule. If the scal
feedback on debt is moderate, dynamic complementarities between rms' pricing decisions and the policy maker's
interest rate decision give rise to the existence of two distinct equilibria.
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It should also be emphasized that the multiplicity of long-run debt levels found in our paper
diers from that shown in neoclassical economies without physical capital. For instance, Lucas
and Stokey (1983) show that when a government with commitment chooses optimal scal policy,
the long-run level of debt depends on initial debt. A related result is found by Krusell et al. (2006)
under no commitment. These authors study non-dierentiable Markov strategies and show that
the equilibrium contains a large, countable set of long-run debt levels. Initial conditions pin down
the element in this set to which the economy converges in a maximum of two periods. Thus, as in
Lucas and Stokey (1983), countries with high initial levels of debt will have high debt forever, and
vice versa. In contrast, long-run debt in our model is determined by expectations of current and
future scal policy rather than the initial level of debt. Our model, if augmented with exogenous
shocks to expectations, is thus consistent with debt dynamics featuring long spells of low public
debt levels followed by spells of high public debt levels.
There is a vast literature on optimal scal policy in macroeconomics. Seminal contributions
include Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), who study optimal capital and labor tax decisions
by a benevolent government that has full commitment to future policies. They show that the
Ramsey equilibrium features no capital income taxation and a negative level of public debt in
the long-run. In the short run, capital, which is in xed supply, is taxed heavily in order to build
up enough assets (negative debt) to nance future government expenditure from asset returns.
This policy is, however, time-inconsistent, i.e. the government would revise it if it were allowed
to re-optimize.3
Markov-perfect optimal taxation under a balanced-budget rule has been studied by Klein
and Ros-Rull (2003), Klein et al. (2008) and Ortigueira (2006), among others. Allowing for
government debt, but abstracting from physical capital, Debortoli and Nunes (2011) nd that
long-run debt in Markov-perfect equilibrium converges to zero under standard parameter values.
Martin (2009) and Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2008) also abstract from physical capital to study optimal
monetary and debt policy. They nd a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium policy which generates
two steady states, one of which is stable and the other one unstable.
Dominguez (2007) and Reis (2011) study time-consistent optimal policy with history-dependent
strategies. These authors nd that the best sustainable equilibrium prescribes zero long-run cap-
ital taxation. A non-balanced budget constraint is key in obtaining this result, as it allows the
government to increase its assets until the lack of commitment is no longer binding. Aiyagari et
al. (2002) drop the complete markets assumption from the Stokey and Lucas (1993) framework,
3The Chamley-Judd is remarkably robust in models with commitment; see, for example, Atkeson et al. (1999).
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which introduces a history dependence on the debt path as opposed to a contingency to future
states. They show that when there are no exogenous bounds on debt the Ramsey planner in their
economy lets public debt converge to a negative level.
Finally, theories as to why governments run decits have also been oered in terms of political
disagreement. When policymakers have dierent preferences on the type of public good that
should be provided and alternate in oce, public debt becomes a tool to inuence the choices of
future policymakers (see Alesina and Tabellini, 1990, and Persson and Svensson, 1989). Song et
al. (2012) study optimal scal policy in a model where subsequent generations of agents (young
and old) vote on policy. In the Markov-perfect political equilibrium, long-run debt depends
crucially on the distortions brought about by taxation. When these distortions are large enough,
debt converges to an interior value; otherwise debt accumulation depletes the economy. In our
paper, we abstract both from political disagreement and alternation in oce and highlight the
role of expectation traps to understanding public decits.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines our model economy.
Section 3 briey reviews optimal policy in the Ramsey equilibrium. Section 4 describes optimal
policy under discretion and provides a closed-form characterization of Markov-perfect equilibria
in a simplied version of our model. Section 5 employs computational methods to discuss the
properties of Markov-perfect policy rules in a calibrated version of our general model. Section 6
concludes. Finally, there are three Appendixes detailing proofs and the numerical approach for
the computation of the model.
2 The Model
Our framework is the standard, non-stochastic neoclassical model of capital accumulation,
extended to include a benevolent government that provides a valued public good. In order to
nance the provision of such public good the government can levy a tax on households' income
and issue public debt. Thus, scal policy in each period consists of the expenditure on the public
good, Gt, the tax rate on income, t, and the issue of public debt, Bt+1, which matures in period
t+ 1.
We begin by describing the problem solved by each agent in this economy. We then charac-
terize the scal policy set by the benevolent government lacking the ability to commit to future
policies. To help compare our results with those arising under full commitment, we also present
a brief review of scal policy in the Ramsey equilibrium.
5
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of homogeneous households with measure one. Each household supplies
one unit of labor and chooses consumption and savings in order to maximize lifetime utility,
subject to a budget constraint and initial endowments of physical capital and public debt,
max
fct;kt+1;bt+1g
1X
t=0
tU(ct; Gt); (2.1)
s:t:
ct + kt+1 + bt+1 = kt + bt + (1  t) [wt + (rt   ) kt + qtbt] (2.2)
k0 > 0 and b0 given.
Small letters are used to denote individual variables and capital letters to denote economy-wide
values. Function U() in equation (2.1) is the instantaneous utility function, which depends on
the consumption of a private good, ct, and the consumption of a public good, Gt. U() is assumed
to be continuously dierentiable, increasing and concave; and 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor.
Labor is supplied inelastically at a real wage rate wt. Household's asset holdings are made up
of physical capital, kt, which is rented to rms at the rate rt, and government bonds, bt, which
bear an interest denoted by qt. Physical capital depreciates at a rate denoted by 0 <  < 1.
Household's total income, net of capital depreciation, is taxed at the rate t. If the government
is a net lender to the private sector, i.e. the household borrows from the government (bt < 0),
then taxable income is net of interest payments.
2.2 Firms
Firms are competitive and produce an aggregate good with a neoclassical production tech-
nology. Total production is given by,
Yt = F (Kt; Lt) = F (Kt; 1) = f(Kt); (2.3)
where Kt denotes the aggregate or economy-wide stock of capital. First-order conditions to prot
maximization imply the typical demand and zero-prots equations,
rt = fK(Kt) (2.4)
wt = f(Kt)  rtKt: (2.5)
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2.3 Government
Fiscal policy involves expenditure in the public good and its nancing through taxes and
debt. The government is benevolent in the sense that it seeks to maximize households' lifetime
utility, (2.1), subject to its budget constraint, to a feasibility restriction, and to the private
sector's rst-order conditions. In addition, government's policies may be conditioned by its lack
of commitment. The budget constraint of the government is
Gt + (1 + qt)Bt = Bt+1 + t [wt + (rt   )Kt + qtBt] : (2.6)
The right-hand side of equation (2.6) represents government's revenues, which are made up of
debt issues, Bt+1, and income taxation. The left-hand side is government's total expenditure,
including the provision of the public good, and the repayment of outstanding nancial liabilities.
3 Ramsey Optimal Fiscal Policy
This section presents a brief review of optimal scal policy in the Ramsey equilibrium of our
model economy. In the Ramsey equilibrium, the benevolent government is assumed to have full
commitment to future policies. Thus, it can credibly announce the whole sequence of expenditure
in the public good, income taxes and debt issues from the rst period onwards. This allows the
government to anticipate the response of the private sector to its scal policy. Hence, the problem
of the government in the Ramsey equilibrium is to choose sequences for taxes and public debt so
that the competitive equilibrium maximizes social welfare [equation (2.1)].
Proposition 1 presents the optimal scal policy in the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium
for our economy.
Proposition 1: In the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium the income tax rate is zero and
the government holds positive assets, i.e. B < 0.
Proof: See Appendix I.
The results in Proposition 1 are well known in the literature of optimal scal policy, and hence
we do not provide further details.
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4 Markov-Perfect Optimal Fiscal Policy
In this section we drop the assumption of government commitment to future policies and
study time-consistent optimal policies. More specically, we focus on dierentiable Markov-
perfect equilibria of this economy populated by a continuum of households and a government
that acts sequentially, foreseeing its future behavior when choosing current levels of the public
good, income taxes and debt issues.
Following recent literature on Markovian policies, we assume that the government |although
unable to commit to future policies| does commit to honoring the tax rate it announces for the
current period and to repaying outstanding debt obligations. Commitment to the current tax
rate implies an intra-period timing of actions that grants the government a rst-mover advantage.
That is, at the beginning of period t, the time-t government sets the tax rate for the period.
Once that choice is publicly known, consumers choose consumption/savings and the composition
of their portfolios, and the government chooses the provision of the public good (or equivalently,
the issue of debt). Governments are thus (intra-period) Stackelberg players and can therefore
anticipate the eects of current taxation on household's decisions.
In sum, under this timing of actions the time-t government has intra-period commitment to
time-t taxes but not to debt issues. This timing ts well what we observe in real economies, where
governments typically make decisions on taxes at discrete times but issue debt continuously. It is
important to note, however, that this particular timing of actions bears no consequences for our
multiplicity result. As we discuss in detail below, the alternative timing in which the government
sets both the tax rate and debt issues at the same time as households choose consumption and
savings also yields a multiplicity of Markov-perfect equilibria.
The optimization problem of a typical household
The household chooses (i) how much to consume and save; and (ii) how to allocate savings
between physical capital and public debt. At the time the household makes these decisions the
tax rate for the period is already known. However, the household must foresee both the current
government's debt policy and future governments' scal policy.
The problem of a household that holds k and b of the physical and government assets, respec-
tively, that has to pay taxes on current income at rate  , that expects the current and future
governments to issue new debt according to the policy  B : (KB)! B0, and expects future
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governments to set taxes according to the policy   : (K B)!  , can be written as
v(k; b;K;B; ) = max
c;k0;b0

U (c;G) + ~v(k0; b0;K 0; B0)
	
(4.1)
s:t:
c+ k0 + b0 = k + b+ (1  ) [w(K) + [r(K)  ] k + q(K)b] ;
where ~v(k0; b0;K 0; B0) is the continuation value as foreseen by the household. !(K); r(K) and
q(K) are pricing functions. The economy-wide stock of physical capital is expected to evolve
according to the law K 0 = H(K;B; ). From the above maximization problem, it follows that the
consumption function in a competitive equilibrium |where today's tax rate is  , future taxes
are set according to policy   and current and futures issues of debt are set according to policy
 B| can be expressed in terms of K;B and  , say C(K;B; ), and must satisfy the following
Euler equation:
Uc (C(K;B; ) ; G) = Uc
 
C(K 0; B0;  0

; G0)

1 +
 
1   0 (fK(K 0)  ) ; (4.2)
where B0 =  B(K;B; ) and  0 =   (K 0; B0). In equilibrium K 0 is given by,
K 0 = K +B + (1  ) [f(K)  K + q(K)B]  C (K;B; ) B0; (4.3)
where G and G0 are given by the time-t and time-(t + 1) governments' budget constraints, res-
pectively. Finally, the pricing functions !(K) and r(K) are given by (2.4) and (2.5), and q(K)
must satisfy the non-arbitrage condition between the two assets,
q(K 0) = fK(K 0)  : (4.4)
The household's Euler equation, (4:2) ; has the usual interpretation: the marginal utility of
consumption equals the present value of the last unit of income devoted to savings. Since physical
capital and debt yield the same return in equilibrium, the supply of public debt determines the
composition of the household's portfolio. This implies a one-to-one crowding out of investment
in capital by public debt. Taxation, on the other hand, impinges on disposable income and thus
may aect the level of consumption, in which case taxation would translate into a non-one-to-one
crowding out of capital investment. The problem of the government is shown next.
The problem of the government
As explained above, the government's lack of commitment to future policies and our focus
on Markov-perfect equilibria allows us to think of the government as a sequence of governments,
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one for each time period. The time-t government sets the tax rate for the period and issues
debt foreseeing the scal policy to be set by successive governments. Following the timing of
actions established above, the government chooses the tax rate at the beginning of the period,
taking into account the eect of  on the level of consumption, as given by the consumption
function, C(K;B; ). In a second stage, the government sets debt issues simultaneously with
the households' decision on consumption and savings. To highlight this timing of scal policy
decisions, we write the problem of the period time-t government as a two-stage maximization
problem. Given the initial choice for taxes, debt issues is the solution to
V (K;B; ) = max
B0
n
U(C(K;B; ); G) +  ~V (K 0; B0)
o
(4.5)
s.t.
K 0 = (1  )K + f(K)  C(K;B; ) G
G =  [f(K)  K + q(K)B] +B0   [1 + q(K)]B;
q(K 0) = fK(K 0)  ;
where V (K;B; ) is the value to the time-t government that has set the tax rate at  and foresees
the scal policy to be set by future governments. ~V (K 0; B0) is next-period value as foreseen by the
time-t government. The debt policy that solves this problem can thus be written as B0(K;B; ).
Therefore, the tax rate set by the time-t government is the solution to
W (K;B) = max

n
U(C(K;B; ); G) +  ~V (K 0; B0 (K;B; ))
o
(4.6)
s.t.
K 0 = (1  )K + f(K)  C(K;B; ) G
G =  [f(K)  K + q(K)B] +B0 (K;B; )  [1 + q(K)]B;
q(K 0) = fK(K 0)  :
The following proposition characterizes the scal policy set by the time-t government.
Proposition 2: Tax and debt policies that solve the government's problem are solutions to the
following Generalized Euler Equations:
UcC + UGG
G + C
= 

U 0c0C
0
K0 + U
0
G0G
0
K0 +
U 0c0C
0
 0 + U
0
G0G
0
 0
G0 0 + C
0
 0
 
f 0K0 + 1     C 0K0  G0K0

(4.7)
and
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UcC + UGG
G + C
= UG + 

U 0c0C
0
B0 + U
0
G0G
0
B0  
U 0c0C
0
 0 + U
0
G0G
0
 0
G0 0 + C
0
 0
 
C 0B0 +G
0
B0

: (4.8)
Proof: See Appendix I.
Some comments on notation are in order. Function arguments in equations (4.7) and (4.8) have
been omitted for expositional clarity. Subscripts denote the variable with respect to which the
derivative is taken. A prime in a variable indicates next-period values, and a prime in a function
indicates it is evaluated at next-period variables. Finally, G = f   K+ qB, GB =  1  (1  )q
and GK = (fK    + qKB)  qKB.
Before providing an interpretation of the two Generalized Euler Equations presented in Propo-
sition 2, we oer the following denition of a Markov-perfect equilibrium in our economy:
Denition: A Markov-perfect equilibrium is a quadruplet of functions C(K;B; ),  B(K;B; ),
  (K;B) and W (K;B), such that:
(i) Given  B and   , C(K;B; ) solves the household's maximization problem.
(ii) Given C(K;B; ),  B and   solve the government's maximization problem. That is,
B0 =  B(K;B; ) and  =   (K;B).
(iii) W (K;B) is the value function of the government.
An alternative denition of Markov-perfect equilibrium in an economy without debt has been
suggested by Harald Uhlig [see Klein et al. (2008) for such denition]. In that framework, the
problem of the government is set as choosing the level expenditure, G, and the stock of capital
for the next period, K 0, directly, and using the feasibility condition to express consumption
as a function of K;K 0; and G. In the current framework, we nd our equilibrium denition
above more transparent for two reasons: First, our timing of actions involves the government
choosing debt simultaneously with the consumption/savings decision. This implies an inability
of the government to anticipate the response of current consumption to debt issues. Under our
timing of events it is thus more straightforward to set the problem of the government as choosing
current policy rather than next-period's capital. Second, by dening the equilibrium in terms
of a consumption function on capital, debt and the tax rate, it will allow us to stress important
equilibrium properties of this consumption function.
The two Generalized Euler Equations, (4.7) and (4.8), which characterize Markov-perfect tax-
ation and debt policies, respectively, have the following interpretation. Equation (4:7) establishes
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that the tax rate has to equate the marginal value of taxation to the marginal value of invest-
ing in physical capital. Equation (4.8) establishes that debt issues have to equate the marginal
value of issuing debt to the marginal value of investing in physical capital (and consequently to
the marginal value of taxation). In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the government is indierent
between using taxes or debt to nance the provision of the public good. Both equations involve
only wedges between today and tomorrow, as subsequent wedges are implicitly handled optimally
by an envelope argument. Consecutive governments, however, disagree on how much to tax to-
morrow [the time-(t + 1) government does not internalize the distortionary eects of its policy
on time-t investment]. The current government thus takes into account the eect of its policy
on tomorrow's initial conditions, K 0 and B0, in order to help compensate for that disagreement.
Following this reasoning, one may interpret the dierent terms in (4.7) and (4.8) as follows.
The left-hand side of equation (4.7) is today's marginal utility of taxation per unit of savings
crowded out. The numerator of this expression is the change in utility from a marginal increase
in the tax rate, which is made up of the change in utility from the private good, UcC , plus the
change in utility from the public good, UGG . The denominator is the amount of savings crowded
out, or, equivalently, the change in consumption of the public and private good brought about
by the increase in the tax rate.
The right-hand side of equation (4.7) is the marginal utility of investing in physical capital.
An extra unit of investment today yields an increase in resources tomorrow by f 0K0 + 1   .
The breakdown of the value of these resources is: (i) C 0K0 of them are consumed as private good,
yielding a value of U 0c0C
0
K0 ; (ii) G
0
K0 corresponds to the increase in the provision of the public good
obtained from the increase in the tax base, which yields a value of U 0G0G
0
K0 ; (iii) the remaining
f 0K0 +1   C 0K0  G0K0 are taxed away, and the marginal value is the left-hand side of equation
(4.7), updated one period ahead. Hence, the right-hand side of (4.7) results from adding up all
these values and discounting.
Equation (4.8) is a non-arbitrage condition between taxation and public debt. Its interpreta-
tion is straightforward. The right-hand side is the value of issuing an extra unit of government
debt today. The rst term on the right-hand side is the value of today's extra public good -
nanced with the increase in government debt. The second term is the present value of the implied
changes in tomorrow's consumption of the private and public good, C 0B0 and G
0
B0 , respectively.
Besides the direct eects on tomorrow's utility, these changes have an eect on tomorrow's taxa-
tion, which must be valued using the marginal utility of taxation. Equation (4.8) establishes that
the value of issuing debt must equal the value of taxation (the left-hand side of the equation).
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A re-arrangement of equation (4:8) oers an alternative interpretation of the non-arbitrage
condition between taxes and bonds in terms of two wedges, Uc   UG and U 0c0   U 0G0 . Such a
re-arrangement yields,
(Uc   UG) C
G + C
+ 
 
U 0c0   U 0G0

G0B0 +
G0 0
G0 0 + C
0
 0
K 00B0

= 0: (4.9)
Equation (4:9) says that the value of using debt instead of taxes to nance the last unit of
public expenditure equals zero in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. The rst term is the net change
in utility today of using debt instead of taxes per unit of forgone savings. The second term
captures the change in future distortions induced by the extra unit of public debt.4 The way the
current government trades o these two wedges when choosing B0 depends on expectations on
future government policy.
4.1 Markov-Perfect Equilibrium: Steady States
The steady state of a Markov-perfect equilibrium is dened as a list of innite sequences
for quantities fCt;Ktg, prices f!t; rt; qtg and scal variables fGt; t; Btg, such that they are
generated by Markov-perfect equilibrium policy rules and its values do not change over time, i.e.
Kt+1 = Kt; Bt+1 = Bt; t+1 = t for all t, and the same is true for consumption and prices.
In this subsection we oer insights on the existence of a multiplicity of steady states, each of
which is generated by a dierent Markov-perfect equilibrium policy. Evaluating equation (4:9) at
the steady state of a Markov-perfect equilibrium yields,
(Uc   UG)

C
G + C
+ 

GB +
G
G + C
K 0B

= 0: (4.10)
This equation suggests that there are two dierent types of tax and debt policies consistent
with the existence of a steady state. The rst one yields Uc = UG, and corresponds to the policy
prescribed by the long-run Ramsey outcome. As shown in Proposition 1, the Ramsey equilibrium
prescribes zero income taxes and positive government asset holdings in the steady state. The
provision of the public good is nanced entirely from the returns on government assets. The next
proposition proves that the long-run Ramsey outcome is the steady state of a Markov-perfect
equilibrium.
4By way of clarity, the expression K00B0 in this second term of the equation denotes the change in tomorrow's
investment with respect to today's issue of debt. More specically, if we combine the two restrictions in the
maximization problem (4.6), we can write K0 as a function, say H, of K;B;B0 and  . Thus, K00B0 is the derivative
of function H evaluated at K0; B0; B00;  0, where B00 =  B(K0; B0;  0) and  0 =   (K0; B0;  0).
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Proposition 3: There exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium that generates the steady-state Ramsey
outcome.
Proof: See Appendix I.
In a related paper, Azzimonti-Renzo et al. (2006) study a model with dierentiated taxes on
capital and labor, and exogenous government expenditure. Within their framework, the authors
nd a Markov-perfect equilibrium which yields zero labor taxes from all initial conditions, K and
B, and zero capital taxes from next-period onwards. As conrmed by our numerical computations,
this result also holds in our model economy: when there are no exogenous bounds on income
taxation, there exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium in which income taxes are zero after one
period, and government assets converge to the long-run Ramsey value. Furthermore, for some
initial conditions the initial income tax is negative, which amounts to a subsidy to households.
The second type of Markov-perfect tax and debt policies consistent with the existence of a
steady state yield positive taxes in the long run. Under this type of policy Uc 6= UG, and the
second term on the left-hand side of equation (4.10) is zero. The next proposition presents an
important feature of these Markov-perfect equilibria.
Proposition 4: Along the steady state of a Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive distortions,
government bonds are not net wealth, i.e., CB(K
; B; ) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix I.
We show below that this result holds not only at the steady state but also along the entire
equilibrium path. In the next section we obtain Markov-perfect equilibria in closed form under
full capital depreciation, and nd that government bonds are not net wealth in equilibrium. Our
numerical results in Section 5 conrm that this result also holds under partial capital depreciation.
4.2 Indeterminacy of the Markov-perfect Equilibrium
In this section we show, by way of an example, the existence of a (continuous) multiplicity of
Markov-perfect equilibria. Specically, we consider the utility function U(C;G) = lnC +  lnG,
and the production function f(K) = K. Further, we assume full capital depreciation,  = 1, and
no tax deductibility of depreciation. Multiplicity is shown using the guess-and-verify approach.
Let us conjecture that the household consumption function is given by C(K) = a1K
 and that
government expenditure in the public good is G(K) = a2K
, where a1 and a2 are constants to be
determined. For the sake of expositional clarity we rst show the existence of the Markov-perfect
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equilibrium with no distortions, i.e., one that yields the ecient allocations, and then show the
existence of a multiplicity of Markov-perfect equilibria with distortions.
The Markov-perfect Equilibrium with no Distortions
Under our conjectured consumption and expenditure functions, the feasibility condition yields
K 0 = (1  a1   a2)K: In the equilibrium without distortions, Generalized Euler Equation (4:7)
implies U 0C0 = U
0
G0 , which under the conjectured functions yields
a2 = a1: (4.11)
The Generalized Euler Equation (4:8) becomes

G
= 

G0
(K 0) 1:
Plugging the expression for K 0 and the conjectured expenditure policy into this equation we
obtain
1  a1   a2 = : (4.12)
It should be noted that the household's Euler equation, (4:2), holds under (4:11) and (4:12).
From these latter two equations we have
a1 =
1  
1 + 
(4.13)
a2 =
(1  )
1 + 
: (4.14)
We now derive the tax and debt policy functions that support these consumption and expen-
diture functions in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. We must nd functions (K;B) and B0(K;B)
that solve the sequence of government's budget constraints under the conjectured functions shown
above.
In the steady state of the Markov-perfect equilibrium with distortions we must have  = 0.
Moreover, the steady-state values K^ and B^ must solve the steady-state versions of the feasibility
condition and the government budget constraint
K^ = (1  a1   a2)K^ (4.15)
a2K^
 = [1  K^ 1]B^; (4.16)
where use of the non-arbitrage condition q = fK   1=(1  ) has been made to derive (4:16). The
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solution to these two equations yields
K^ =

1
1  a1   a2
 1
 1
(4.17)
B^ =
a2K^
K^1    : (4.18)
Accordingly, the debt-to-capital ratio in the steady state of this Markov-perfect equilibrium is
B^
K^
=   (1  )
(1 + )(1  );
from where it is apparent that debt is negative in the steady state.
We now obtain the dynamics towards this steady state and derive the functions (K;B) and
B0(K;B). Using our conjectured functions and the non-arbitrage condition, the budget constraint
for the period-(t+ 1) government is,
B00
(K 0)
= a2 +
1

B0
K
: (4.19)
Since  < 1, this equation is unstable. Therefore, we must have that
B00
(K 0)
=
B0
K
=
B^
K^
:
Then, using the steady-state values for physical capital and debt shown above along with the
values for a1 and a2 in (4:13) and (4:14), we obtain the debt policy function
B0 =   (1  )
(1 + )(1  )K
:
Plugging this policy into the period-t government's budget constraint we nd the tax rate set by
this government
(K;B) =
a2 + 
B
K   (1 )(1+)(1 )
1 + BK
:
Finally, it is straightforward to show that this tax function evaluated at K 0 and B0 yields a tax
rate equal to zero, i.e., (K 0; B0) = 0, which conrms that the tax rate jumps to its steady-state
value in one period.
The Markov-perfect Equilibrium with Distortions
We now show that there is a multiplicity of Markov-perfect equilibria where U 0C0 6= U 0G0 : We
again guess that consumption and expenditure policy functions are given by: C(K) = a1K
 and
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G(K) = a2K
, where a1 and a2 are parameters to be determined. Let us look for solutions where
the wedge between marginal utilities of private and public good consumption is proportional to
the inverse of output, that is,
U 0C0   U 0G0 =
a3
(K 0)
;
where a3 is a constant. We will show that there is a continuum of values for a3 consistent with a
Markov-perfect equilibrium. This equation yields,
a2   a1 = a1a2a3: (4.20)
Now, making use of the conjectured consumption function the household's Euler equation
becomes,
1
a1K
= 
1
a1(K 0)
h
(1   0)(K 0) 1
i
;
which, after using the feasibility condition, K 0 = (1  a1   a2)K, yields,
 0 = 1  1  a1   a2

: (4.21)
Hence, under our conjectures the tax rate in equilibrium is constant from t+1 onwards. Plugging
the conjectures into the Generalized Euler Equation (4:8) we get

a2K
= 

1
a1(K 0)
  
a2(K 0)

a1(K
0) 1 +

a2(K 0)
(K 0) 1

:
Under the assumed wedge between marginal utilities this equation gives,

a2K
= 

a3
(K 0)
a1(K
0) 1 +

a2(K 0)
(K 0) 1

:
Further, using the feasibility condition we obtain,
(1  a1   a2) 

= a1a2a3+ : (4.22)
Note that given a3, equations (4:20) and (4:22) can be solved for a1 and a2.
From the budget constraint of the period-(t + 1) government, we obtain debt issues by this
government as
B00 = (a2    0)(K 0) + (1   0)(K 0) 1B0;
where  0 is the constant shown in (4:21). Dividing by (K 0) we get
B00
(K 0)
= (a2    0) + (1   0)B
0
K 0
;
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and using the implied law of motion for capital on the right-hand side,
B00
(K 0)
= (a2    0) + 1

B0
K
:
Since  < 1, we must have that B
00
(K0) =
B0
K =
B^
K^
=  1(a2    0): From this we obtain the
period-t debt policy function as
B0 =

   1(a2   
0)K:
Plugging this policy function into the budget constraint of the period-t government we nd its
tax policy function as
(K;B) =
a2 + 
B
K    1(a2    0)
1 + BK
:
It is readily seen that this policy function, when evaluated at K 0 and B0, yields the constant
obtained in (4:21) for all values of a3. Consequently, any value of a3 yielding solutions to a1
and a2 from (4:20) and (4:22) that fall within the feasible range for all economic variables is
consistent with a Markov-perfect equilibrium. In Appendix I we show that these solutions satisfy
the second-order optimality conditions. That is, no government has an incentive to deviate.
REMARKS: A couple of remarks on the Markov-perfect equilibria presented above are in order.
(1) The household consumption function is independent of current taxes. That is, in equilibrium
households do not use the tax rate set by the period-t government to pin down the level of
consumption. This implies that the assumption of government's within-period commitment to
taxes is not binding in equilibrium. Hence, the Markov-perfect equilibria shown above also
arise when this commitment is removed, and households and the government are assumed to
make all their decisions simultaneously within the period. (A formal characterization of Markov-
perfect equilibria under this alternative timing of actions with simultaneous moves is presented
in Appendix II.) (2) The value function does not depend on the level of public debt. This follows
immediately from the fact that both the consumption function and government expenditure in the
public good are independent of the level of debt. The tax policy function does depend, however,
on the debt level in equilibrium.
The two equilibrium properties described in (1) and (2) above provide the key to understand-
ing the indeterminacy of Markov-perfect equilibrium policy rules. Note rst that the period-t
government can provide a xed level of the public good, say G^, using dierent combinations of
taxes and debt issues. In particular, the set of pairs (;B0) that yield G^ is given by the government
budget constraint,
G^ =  [f(K)  K + q(K)B] +B0   [1 + q(K)]B:
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Since consumption is independent of taxes in equilibrium |property (1)|, period-t taxation
is non distortionary from the standpoint of the period-t government. Further, the government's
continuation value does not depend on the level of debt |from property (2). Since both  and
B0 are non distortionary from the standpoint of the period-t government, this government has
more policy instruments than policy goals, thus rendering one of the instruments redundant. As
households pin down consumption based on expectations on government expenditure (to forecast
the aggregate stock of capital in period t+1) and on next-period taxes, there always exists a pair of
welfare-maximizing policies for the period-t government, (;B0), so that household's expectations
are fullled. Technically, this implies that the government's objective function, under any level of
consumption pinned down by the household, reaches its maximum at a one-dimensional space in
(;B0). Hence, whatever expectations households may have on current debt issuance (and future
policies), there is a welfare-maximizing policy that fullls these expectations.
Proposition 5 below presents the indeterminacy result and proves the existence of a \dis-
continuity at innity". I.e., the set of Markov-perfect equilibria changes discontinuously when
the economy's time horizon is extended from nite to innite. In particular, we show that
steady states implied by Markov-perfect equilibria with positive distortions are not the limit of
a nite-horizon economy's Markov-perfect equilibrium as the time horizon goes to innity. On
the contrary, the steady state of the Markov-perfect equilibrium without distortions is the limit
of the nite-horizon Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 5: There exists a continuum of Markov-perfect equilibria. Given K0 and B0, the
Markov-perfect equilibrium is (globally) indeterminate. Equilibrium multiplicity results from a
discontinuity at innity. That is, if T is the economy's planning horizon there is a unique Markov-
perfect equilibrium featuring T = 0 and BT < 0. If T = 1 there is a multiplicity of Markov-
perfect equilibria.
Proof: See Appendix I.
We now calibrate and numerically solve our model economy with tax-deductible, partial cap-
ital depreciation, and show the existence of a multiplicity of Markov-perfect equilibria with dis-
tortions. In doing so, we show that the two properties of Markov-perfect equilibrium policy rules
discussed in (1) and (2) above are not specic to our particular example economy, but also hold
in the general model with partial capital depreciation. Finally, we also conrm numerically that
the assumption of within-period commitment to taxes is not binding.
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5 Markov-Perfect Equilibria in a Calibrated Economy
In this section, we study Markov-perfect equilibria in a calibrated version of the model econ-
omy presented in Section 2. Markov-perfect equilibria are found as the solutions to the three
functional equations dened by the household's Euler equation, eq. (4:2), and the two Gener-
alized Euler equations, eqs. (4:7) and (4:8). Our algorithm5 computes approximate solutions
to these functional equations and then checks that there are no protable deviations. That is,
no government wants to deviate from the policy prescribed in each of these solutions. Special
attention will be devoted rst to Markov-perfect equilibria featuring income taxation and positive
debt issues in the long run.
Functional Forms and Parameter Values The instantaneous utility function is assumed to
be of the CES form in the composite good ctG

t , that is,
U(c;G) =
(c G)1    1
1   ; (5.1)
where 0 <  < 1, and 1= denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of the composite
good. The production technology is characterized by the standard Cobb-Douglas function, with
 denoting the capital's share of income, i.e.
f(K) = AK; A > 0: (5.2)
Parameter values are set as follows. The constant in the production function, A, and the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, , are both set equal to one. The value of
 is set at 0.36, which is the capital's share of income in the US economy; the depreciation rate
of capital is set at 0.09, which is a standard value in macroeconomic models;  is set at 0.96, and
 is 0.2. These parameter values are in line with those used in the macro literature. Importantly,
the multiplicity of equilibria discussed below does not hinge on this particular set of parameter
values. Multiplicity is a generic result in our model economy.
Steady States Figure 1 plots the ray of steady states in the space of scal variables (;B). Each
point in this ray corresponds to a steady state generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium. The
point (0; 5:3090) in this Figure is the steady state generated by the Markov-perfect equilibrium
that yields the Ramsey outcome.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
5See Appendix III for a sketch of the numerical procedure.
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Table 1 below presents allocations and scal variables in three of these steady states, along
with allocations in the ecient solution (equilibrium with lump sum taxes). Column [1] presents
the ecient allocations. Columns [2] to [4] present three steady states implied by dierent Markov-
perfect equilibrium policy rules. Column [2] corresponds to the Markov-perfect equilibrium with
no distortions. Allocations and scal policy variables in this steady state coincide with those
of the Ramsey equilibrium. (Note that allocations in the Ramsey equilibrium are the ecient
ones.) In the Markov-perfect equilibrium of column [2] the government does not distort long-run
investment and sets income taxes equal to zero. Public expenditure is nanced entirely from the
income generated by the assets owned by the government. That is, negative public debt (positive
asset holdings) is the only source of income for the government in this steady state. Columns
[3] and [4] correspond to steady states generated by Markov-perfect equilibrium policy rules with
positive distortions. The steady state in [3] features a tax rate of 19% and a debt-to-GDP ratio
of 56%.
Table 1
Steady-State Equilibria
Markov-perfect
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Ecient No distortions Positive distortions Positive distortions
Y 1.7608 1.7608 1.6934 1.7053
K 4.8144 4.8144 4.3201 4.4045
C 1.1063 1.1063 1.1017 1.1044
G 0.2213 0.2213 0.2032 0.2045
G=C 0.2 0.2 0.1844 0.1852
 indet. 0 0.1905 0.1562
B=Y indet. -3.015 0.5639 0
W -5.0157 -5.0157 -5.5525 -5.4533
Notes: Steady-state values for the ecient solution and three Markov-perfect equilibria.
Transitional Dynamics We now present Markov-perfect equilibrium policy rules for consump-
tion, savings, government expenditure in the public good, taxes and debt issues. To simplify
the exposition, we restrict attention to equilibrium policy rules yielding the steady state with
positive distortions in column [3] of Table 1. Equilibrium policy rules yielding the steady state
in column [2] (no distortions) are suciently well known from the literature on Ramsey optimal
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policy, and are not therefore discussed here. We start by computing equilibrium policy rules
within a relatively small subset of the state space containing the steady state. Then, we expand
this subset so that we can show equilibrium dynamics between this steady state and the one
without distortions.
Figure 1 shows the tax policy rule,   (K;B). The tax rate increases both with capital and
debt. Figure 2 shows the debt policy rule,  B(K;B;  (K;B)). Debt issues decrease sharply with
capital, indicating that, in this equilibrium, capital-rich economies rely relatively less on public
debt to nance government expenditure. Figure 3 shows public expenditure. The private-good
consumption function is displayed in Figure 4.
[Insert Figures 2 to 5 around here]
The stability of the steady-state implied by these policy rules is illustrated in Figures 5 to
7. Net investment in physical capital, K 0  K, is presented in Figure 5. In Figure 6 we plot the
change in the level of debt, B0  B. Finally, Figure 7 presents the two loci, K 0 = K and B0 = B.
The point in which these two loci intersect corresponds to the steady-state values for K and B.
The arrows indicate the direction of the trajectories starting in the dierent regions of the state
space.
[Insert Figures 6, 7 and 8 around here]
In order to provide accuracy measures of our numerical computations, Figures 8, 9 and 10
plot relative residuals in the household's Euler equation and the two Generalized Euler equations,
respectively. Errors outside collocation points are very small, actually less than 0:001 of 1 per cent,
and satisfy relatively well the equi-oscillation property: The sign of the errors alternates between
positive and negative. Overestimation and underestimation alternate between collocation points
and each error function achieves its extreme points about ten times. This property of the errors
indicates that our approximations are close to being optimal, in the sense that there are no better
polynomials to approximate the unknown functions.
[Insert Figures 9, 10, 11 around here]
Public Debt is not Net Wealth in a Markov-perfect Equilibrium We have shown in
Proposition 4 that at the steady state of a Markov-perfect equilibrium with long-run distortions
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public debt is not net worth. In the example economy of Section 4 we showed that this result holds
true along the entire equilibrium path (property 2 in the remarks). Here, we conrm numerically
that this is also the case in our calibrated economy with partial capital depreciation. In our
numerical solution, absolute values of the derivative of the consumption function with respect to
debt, CB(K;B; ), where  is evaluated at   (K;B), are below 2 10 6 for all K and B in our
subset of the state space. We have also computed the derivative of the consumption function
with respect to the tax rate, C (K;B; ) evaluated at   (K;B). In the example economy we
showed that this derivative is zero in a Markov-perfect equilibrium (property 1 in the remarks).
Our numerical solution yields absolute values for this derivative below 110 4. Finally, absolute
values of the derivative of the value function with respect to public debt in our numerical solution
are below 1  10 5. This extends the result found in the example economy with full capital
depreciation.
Second-order Conditions: Non-protable Deviations In models with no commitment, the
concavity of the government's maximization problem is not guaranteed by the concavity of the
utility and production functions. We must check that the period-t government is indeed maximi-
zing utility by setting the tax rate and debt issues prescribed by our computed solutions. In other
words, we must show that there are no protable deviations for the period-t government, when all
subsequent governments are expected to set their policy according to the computed policy rules
and households expect the current and future governments to do so. That is, the maximization
problem of the period-t government must be concave in  and B0 when current utility and the
continuation value are evaluated at the computed policy rules, C(K;B; ),  0 =   (K 0; B0), and
B00 =  B(K 0; B0;  0).
Figures 12 to 14 present our results. Figure 12 plots the value of the period-t government at
K = K and B = B (steady-state values in column [3] of Table 1), as a function of  and B0.
This gure shows that the maximization problem of the period-t government is concave in the
considered subset of the state space. Figure 13 is a contour map of Figure 12. Figure 14 plots the
isoline where the value of the period-t government attains its maximum, along with the tax rate
and debt issues prescribed by our computed policy rules evaluated at K = K and B = B. That
is, the maximum of the period-t government problem is attained by a one-dimensional space in
(;B0) which includes the policy prescribed by the computed Markov-perfect equilibrium rules,
(; B). This shows that the period-t government has no incentives to deviate.
[Insert Figures 12, 13 and 14 around here]
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5.1 Equilibrium Dynamics between Steady States
Our numerical results above display equilibrium dynamics of one Markov-perfect equilibrium with
positive distortions within a small subset of the state space containing the steady state of this
equilibrium. In this section, we use the aforementioned properties of the equilibrium consumption
function to expand the computation of this Markov-perfect equilibrium to a larger subset of the
state space containing also the steady state of the Markov-perfect equilibrium without distortions
(column [2] in Table 1). In particular, the fact that public debt is not household's net wealth in a
Markov-perfect equilibrium allows us to approximate the unknown consumption function without
having to condition on the stock of debt. We can then solve for a Markov-perfect equilibrium
within an arbitrarily large subset of the state space.
Figures 15 to 19 display transitional dynamics to steady state [3] from initial conditions to
capital and debt given by steady state [2] (the steady state generated by the Markov-perfect
equilibrium without distortions and by the Ramsey equilibrium). Let us denote these initial
conditions by (KRO; BRO). At this state, debt is negative, which means the government is
endowed with nancial claims on the private sector. If households expect current and future
governments to employ the policy rules of the Markov-perfect equilibrium without distortions,
the economy stays at (KRO; BRO) (dotted line in the Figures). Conversely, if households expect
that the current and future governments will employ the policy rules associated with the Markov-
perfect equilibrium with distortions, the economy converges to the steady state given in column
[3] of Table 1 (solid lines in the Figures). The intuition behind this result is as follows. If
households expect taxes and debt to be positive from next-period onwards, they increase current
consumption. Since households do not use the current tax rate to pin down consumption, the
policy problem of the period-0 government is to optimally trade o public consumption, G, and
savings, K 0 and B0. Under expectations that future governments will use the policy rules of the
equilibrium with distortions, the continuation value for the period-0 government is independent
of the level of debt, B0. As public consumption crowds out capital accumulation one-to-one, the
optimal policy in period 0 hence implements UG =  ~V
0
K . Moreover, the period-0 government is
indierent between any combination of  and B0 that delivers the desired levels of G (and K 0). An
optimal current policy is therefore to implement G via a negative tax rate (which implies a lump-
sum transfer to households) and issue debt exactly as expected by households. The expectation
of positive taxes and debt is hence self-fullling.
[Insert Figures 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 around here]
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To further illustrate this mechanism, Figure 20 plots the welfare level of adopting dierent
policies. Welfare for the period-0 government of setting the policy prescribed by the equilibrium
with distortions, when households and future governments are expected to also follow policy
rules of the equilibrium with distortions, is higher than that of setting the policy prescribed by
the equilibrium without distortions. In Figure 20 we plot welfare for the period-0 government
holding policy rules for households and future governments xed at those of the equilibrium with
distortions. Welfare under the policies of the equilibrium with distortions is 5:0633, which is
the level indicated by the horizontal line in Figure 20. The curve beneath the horizontal line
gives welfare under dierent deviations. We consider deviations where the tax rate is set at zero
and debt issues range between  5:32 and  5:3. Welfare of the particular deviation where the
period-0 government sets  = 0 and B0 = BRO, that is, the tax rate and debt level associated
with the policy rules of the equilibrium without distortions, is given by the square dot in the
Figure. This dot is below the horizontal line and hence the government obtains less welfare
than under no deviation. In sum, the period-0 government has no incentive to deviate from the
policies prescribed by the considered equilibrium with distortions. The other dot on the curve,
corresponding to  = 0 and B0 =  5:3151; yields the same level of welfare as the one attained by
policy rules of the equilibrium with distortions. The existence of this equal-welfare pair of taxes
and debt issues is explained by the one-dimensional space in (;B0) that solves the government
maximization problem. We showed this space both in the example economy and, numerically,
in Figure 14. Finally, we have also considered deviations where B0 is kept xed and  is let to
change, and found similar results.
[Insert Figure 20 around here]
6 Conclusions
This paper studies Markov-perfect optimal scal policy in a neoclassical economy with
innitely-lived households. We extend a recent literature on time-consistent policies to economies
where the government can also issue debt to nance government expenditures and households
hold physical capital and public debt in their portfolios. Previous studies on Markov-perfect
policy abstract from either public debt, by assuming a government's period-by-period balanced
budget constraint, or from physical capital, assuming that labor is the only factor of production.
We nd a multiplicity of Markov-perfect equilibria. Equilibrium multiplicity in our model is
generated by expectation traps: Households' consumption decisions based on expectations about
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scal policy inuence government policy so that those expectations are fullled. In shaping
these dynamic complementarities between households and the government, two properties of
the consumption function play a key role. First, the tax rate announced at the beginning of a
given period is not used by the households to pin down consumption for the period. Second,
government debt is not net wealth for the household. These two properties imply a redundancy
of policy instruments and hence a multiplicity of equilibria.
Our results illustrate how in environments where the government is unable to commit, tax
rates and public debt become determined by expectations. In the set of equilibria found in our
model, the highest level of social welfare is attained by the Markov-perfect equilibrium that yields
the allocations and policy of the Ramsey equilibrium. This result has a number of implications in
terms of institutional design. In particular, it has implications for the ongoing debate on whether
scal policy should be conducted by an independent, committed agency, as it is the case with
monetary policy. The introduction of caps on government decits is only a rst step toward
limiting the potential negative welfare eects of expectation traps. In sum, our ndings in this
paper extend to scal policy the same concerns about coordination failures raised in the literature
on optimal discretionary monetary policy.
7 Appendices
This section contains three Appendices. Appendix I presents the proofs of the Propositions and
the analysis of second-order optimality conditions for the economy of our example in Section
4. Appendix II presents the characterization of Markov-perfect equilibria under the alternative
timing of actions, namely simultaneous moves. Appendix III briey describes the numerical
algorithm used in the computation of Markov-perfect equilibria.
Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
A government with full commitment sets innite sequences fGt; t; Bt+1g1t=0 so that the im-
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plied competitive equilibrium maximizes welfare. That is,
max
fGt;t;Bt+1g
1X
t=0
tU(Ct; Gt) (7.1)
s:t:
Ct +Kt+1 +Gt = f(Kt) + (1  )Kt (7.2)
Gt + [1 + rt   ]Bt = Bt+1 + t[(rt   )(Kt +Bt) + !t] (7.3)
Uc(Ct; Gt) = Uc(Ct+1; Gt+1)[1 + (1  t+1)(rt+1   )]; t = 0:::1; (7.4)
K0 and B0 are given.
After dening new variables ~rt  (1   t)(rt   ) and ~!t  (1   t)!t, and formulating the
problem of the government as choosing after-tax rental prices, the rst-order condition with
respect to Kt+1 (by using the primal approach) can be written as,
 t =  [t+1(rt+1   ~rt+1)) +  t+1(1 + rt+1   )] ; (7.5)
where  t and t are Lagrange multipliers. Using the Euler equation, equation (7:4) in a steady-
state equilibrium becomes,
(  + )(r   ~r) = 0; (7.6)
from which it follows that  = 0 in the steady-state equilibrium, and, consequently, B < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The rst-order condition to B0 in government's maximization problem (4:5) is given by,
UG    ~V 0K0 +  ~V 0B0 = 0: (7.7)
The rst-order condition to  in government's maximization (4:6) is,
UcC + UG
 
G +B
0

   ~V 0K0  C +G +B0+  ~V 0B0B0 = 0; (7.8)
which, after making use of (7.7), simplies to,
UcC + UGG    ~V 0K0 (C +G ) = 0: (7.9)
Envelope conditions, along with W (K;B) = ~V (K;B), yield,
WK = UcCK + UGGK + W
0
K0 [1 + fK      CK  GK ] (7.10)
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WB = UcCB + UGGB + W
0
K0 [ CB  GB] : (7.11)
Forwarding these envelope conditions one period and using the above rst-order conditions,
we obtain the two Generalized Euler Equations, (4:7) and (4:8) ; presented in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
As shown in Proposition 1, in the steady state of the Ramsey equilibrium income taxes are
zero and the government holds negative debt (assets) to nance the provision of the public good.
The government does not rely on distortionary taxation, and the eciency condition, Uc = UG,
is attained. In this proof we show that the system of equations characterizing the steady states
of Markov-perfect equilibria has a solution with these properties.
Let us start by assuming that Uc = UG. Then, from (7.9) it follows that Uc = WK . From
(7.11) it is then easy to see that WB = 0. Finally, equation (7.10) becomes,
1

= 1 + fK   ; (7.12)
which, along with the consumer's Euler equation, implies that  = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof follows directly from (4.10) along with the non-arbitrage, Euler and feasibility
conditions. In a Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive distortions Uc 6= UG: Thus, from
(4.10),
C
G + C
+ 

GB +
G
G + C
K 0B

= 0: (7.13)
Using the feasibility condition, this is equivalent to
C
G + C

1

+ CB +GB

= CB: (7.14)
Then, plugging GB =  (1   )q   1 and the non-arbitrage condition, q = fK   ; into equation
(7.14) and using the household's Euler equation, it follows that CB must be equal to zero at the
steady state of a Markov-perfect equilibrium with positive distortions.
Second-order Optimality Conditions in the Example Economy
We show that the solutions obtained from feasibility and rst-order conditions in our example
economy also satisfy second-order conditions for optimality and are thus Markov-perfect equi-
libria. We do so by showing that none of the successive governments has incentives to deviate
from any of these solutions if households and future governments are expected to follow them. In
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particular, we show that the maximization problem of the period-0 government is concave under
any of the solutions found above and that, hence, there are no protable deviations.
Let us rst construct the continuation value for the time-0 government when households
are expected to set consumption according to the Markov strategy C(K) = a1K
, and future
governments are expected to set expenditure in the public good according to G(K) = a2K
. The
continuation value for the time-zero government under these policies is
~V (K1) =
1X
t=1
t 1[ln(a1Kt ) +  ln(a2K

t )]; (7.15)
which can be written as
~V (K1) =
1X
t=1
t 1[ln a1 +  lnKt +  ln a2 +  lnKt]:
Rearranging this expression, we obtain
~V (K1) =
1X
t=1
t 1[ln a1 +  ln a2 + (1 + ) lnKt]
or
~V (K1) = [ln a1 +  ln a2]
1X
t=1
t 1 + (1 + )
1X
t=1
t 1 lnKt
or, equivalently
~V (K1) =
ln a1 +  ln a2
1   + (1 + )
1X
t=1
t 1 lnKt:
Under the assumed policies, the law of motion for capital for t  2 is
Kt = (1  a1   a2)
t 1 1
 1 K
t 1
1 :
Therefore, the continuation value becomes,
~V (K1) =
ln a1 +  ln a2
1   + (1 + )
1X
t=1
t 1

t 1   1
  1 ln(1  a1   a2) + 
t 1 lnK1

:
Rearranging we obtain
~V (K1) =
ln a1 +  ln a2
1   + (1 + )
"
ln(1  a1   a2)
1X
t=1
t 1
t 1   1
  1 + lnK1
1X
t=1
t 1t 1
#
;
or
~V (K1) =
ln a1 +  ln a2
1   + (1 + )

ln(1  a1   a2)

1
(1  )(1  ) +
1X
t=1
t 1
t 1
  1
!
+
lnK1
1X
t=1
()t 1
#
;
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or
~V (K1) =
ln a1 +  ln a2
1   + (1 + )


ln(1  a1   a2)
(1  )(1  ) +
lnK1
1  

;
or, rearranging,
~V (K1) =  +
(1 + )
1   lnK1; (7.16)
where
  ln a1 +  ln a2
1   +
(1 + )
(1  )(1  ) ln(1  a1   a2): (7.17)
Then, given a1 and q0, the maximization problem for the time-zero government is,
max
0;G0;B1

lnC(K0) +  lnG0 + 

 +
(1 + )
1   lnK1

(7.18)
s:t:
K1 = K

0   a1K0  G0 (7.19)
G0 = 0(K

0 + q0B0) +B1   (1 + q0)B0 (7.20)
which is a concave maximization problem. The redundancy of policy instruments can be seen
from the rst-order conditions with respect to 0 and B1, respectively:
(K0 + q0B0)
0(K0 + q0B0) +B1   (1 + q0)B0
=
(1 + )(K0 + q0B0)
(1  ) [K0   a1K0   0(K0 + q0B0) B1 + (1 + q0)B0]

0(K0 + q0B0) +B1   (1 + q0)B0
=
(1 + )
(1  ) [K0   a1K0   0(K0 + q0B0) B1 + (1 + q0)B0]
:
If we divide the rst of these equations by K0 +q0B0 we obtain the second. As a consequence,
we can only pin down a one-dimensional space in (0; B1) that solves the maximization problem of
the period-zero government. This government has no incentive to deviate from any of the solutions
found above because the policy implied by these solutions belongs to the one-dimensional space
in (0; B1). More specically, given a particular a1 and a2 the period-zero's government policy
under no deviation is given by,
a2K

0 = 0(K

0 + q0B0) +B1   (1 + q0)B0;
and any of the two equations above.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Here we prove that the nite-horizon economy with nal period T has a unique Markov-
perfect equilibrium with T = 0 and BT < 0. Without loss of generality we assume full capital
depreciation. The proof, although algebraically tedious, is straightforward.
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In the nite-horizon economy with nal period T , households consume all their resources in
period T and then KT+1 = BT+1 = 0. The problem of the time-T government is then,
max
T
flnCT +  lnGT g
s:t:
KT = CT +GT (7.21)
GT = T [K

T + qTBT ]  (1 + qT )BT : (7.22)
The rst-order condition to this problem is,
1
CT
= 
1
GT
; (7.23)
from where it follows that GT = CT . Using the feasibility condition, (7.21), we obtain,
CT =
1
1 + 
KT (7.24)
GT =

1 + 
KT : (7.25)
In period T   1, the households' Euler equation is,
1
CT 1
= 
1
CT
(1  T )K 1T ; (7.26)
and the non-arbitrage condition between the two assets is
qT = K
 1
T   1=(1  T ): (7.27)
The scal policy chosen by the time-(T 1) government is obtained as the solution to the following
maximization problem,
max
T 1;BT
flnCT 1 +  lnGT 1 +  (lnCT +  lnGT )g
s:t:
KT 1 = KT + CT 1 +GT 1 (7.28)
GT 1 = BT + T 1

KT 1 + qT 1BT 1
  (1 + qT 1)BT 1 (7.29)
and equations (7:22); (7:24); (7:25); (7:26) and (7:27):
Before deriving the rst-order conditions, we nd it appropriate to plug (7.24) into (7.26), to
write the household Euler equation as,
KT = (1 + )(1  T )CT 1: (7.30)
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From the budget constraint of the government in T , equation (7.22), from the level of expenditure
in T , equation (7.25), and from the non-arbitrage condition in T   1, equation (7.27), we obtain
that,
1  T = 1
(1 + )[1 + BTKT ]
: (7.31)
Plugging this expression into (7.30) we get,
KT = CT 1   BT ; (7.32)
which, along with the feasibility condition and the budget constraint of the government in T   1,
yields,
CT 1 =
KT 1   T 1[KT 1 + qT 1BT 1]  (1  )BT + (1 + qT 1)BT 1
1 + 
: (7.33)
This is the level of consumption in period T   1 as a function of the policy chosen in period
T   1, i.e. T 1 and BT . Note, however, that before deriving the rst-order conditions of the
period-(T 1) government we must substitute BT by its expectation, say BeT ; in (7:33), in order to
embed our timing of actions. The period-(T  1) government chooses taxes before the household's
consumption-savings decision, but chooses debt issues simultaneously with the household decision.
Therefore, this government cannot anticipate the eect of debt issues on the level of consumption
in T   1.
The rst-order conditions with respect to T 1 and BT are, respectively,
  1
CT 1
1
1 + 
+

GT 1
=
22
1 + 
1
CT
K 1T (7.34)

GT 1
= 
1
CT
K 1T : (7.35)
Plugging one of these equations into the other, we get
1
CT 1
= 
1
CT
K 1T : (7.36)
Using the household Euler equation, (7.26), it immediately follows that T = 0. Finally, from the
budget constraint of the period-T government we obtain that BT < 0.
Appendix II: Alternative Timing of Actions: Simultaneous Moves
This Appendix characterizes Markov-perfect optimal policy in an economy where the
government sets its policy |both taxes and debt issues| at the same time households choose
consumption and savings. In contrast to the timing of events studied above, the tax rate for
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the current period is not announced before households make their decision, implying that they
must now forecast this rate as well as debt issues. The consumption function that solves the
household's Euler equation can now be expressed in terms of K and B, say C(K;B),
Uc (C(K;B) ; G) = Uc
 
C(K 0; B0

; G0)

1 +
 
1   0 (fK(K 0)  ) ; (7.37)
where B0 =  B(K;B) and  0 =   (K 0; B0). And K 0 is given by,
K 0 = K +B + (1  ) [f(K)  K + q(K)B]  C (K;B) B0: (7.38)
Since households do not know the tax rate for the current period, they anticipate that the
government will set  as a function of K and B,   (K;B).
The government is no longer an intra-period Stackelberg player, and it sets  and B0 taking as
given the consumption function and the policy of future governments. As will become apparent
below, the functional equations characterizing a Markov-perfect equilibrium are now substantially
simpler.
The problem of the current government can then be written as,
V (K;B) = max
;B0
n
U(C(K;B); G) +  ~V (K 0; B0)
o
(7.39)
s.t.
K 0 = (1  )K + f(K)  C(K;B) G
G =  [f(K)  K + q(K)B] +B0   [1 + q(K)]B;
and equation (4.4):
By assuming that savings is the residual variable, the government is unable to aect current
private-good consumption, thus leaving consumption of the public good and the continuation
value as its only trade-o. First-order conditions with respect to  and B0 are, respectively,
UG =  ~V
0
K0 and GB0(
~V 0K0   UG) =  ~V 0B0 . From these two conditions it is straightforward to see
that ~V 0B0 = 0. Using the envelope conditions we obtain the two generalized Euler equations,
(U 0C0   U 0G0)C 0B0 = 0 (7.40)
UG = 

U 0C0C
0
K0 + U
0
G0(1 + f
0
K0      C 0K0)

: (7.41)
Under this alternative timing, the possibility of multiple Markov-perfect equilibria becomes read-
ily apparent from equation (7:40). Both a Markov-perfect equilibrium with no distortions,
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U 0C0 = U
0
G0 , and Markov-perfect equilibria with distortions and with C
0
B0 = 0 satisfy this condi-
tion. The rst of these equilibria yields a steady state that coincides with the Ramsey outcome.
The second type of equilibria yield steady states with positive taxes.
Appendix III: Numerical Approach
This appendix outlines the algorithm for the computation of Markov-perfect equilibria.
The rst challenge in the computation of the three unknown functions C(K;B; ),   (K;B), and
 B(K;B; ) stems from the presence of the derivatives of the consumption function in the two
generalized Euler equations, (4.7) and (4.8). In a steady state, these derivatives must be solved
for, thus making the number of unknowns exceed the number of equations.
The computational method is an application of a projection method which approximates the
three unknown functions with a combination of Chebyshev polynomials. Within the class of
orthogonal polynomials, Chebyshev polynomials stand out for their eciency to approximate
smooth functions.6 The unknown coecients in the approximate functions are then obtained so
that they satisfy the three Euler equations at some collocation points within a subset of the state
space, [Kmin;Kmax] [Bmin; Bmax].
Thus, we approximate functions for consumption, taxes and the issue of debt by7:
C^(K;B;  ;~a) =
nckX
i=0
ncbX
j=0
ncX
`=0
aij` ij`(K;B; ) (7.42)
 ^ (K;B; ~d) =
nbkX
i=0
nbbX
j=0
dij ij(K;B) (7.43)
 ^B(K;B;~h) =
nkX
i=0
nbX
j=0
hijij(K;B); (7.44)
where ij`(K;B; ) and ij(K;B) are tensor products of univariate Chebyshev polynomials, which
form the multidimensional basis for approximation. For instance, ij(K;B) = i(K)j(B), with
i(K) denoting the Chebyshev polynomial of order i in K and j(B) the Chebyshev polynomial
of order j in B. Since Chebyshev polynomials are only dened in the interval [ 1; 1], K and B
6For a complete characterization of their properties and a rigorous exposition of projection techniques see Judd
(1992, 1998). For a previous application of these ideas to the computation of Markovian optimal taxes see Ortigueira
(2006).
7Since the derivative of  B(K;B; ) with respect to  is not needed to solve our system of functional equations,
we approximate the debt policy rule at equilibrium by a function of K and B alone, replacing  by   (K;B).
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must be re-scaled accordingly, using the chosen Kmin;Kmax; Bmin; Bmax. That is,
ij(K;B) = i

2(K  Kmin)
Kmax  Kmin   1

 j

2(B  Bmin)
Bmax  Bmin   1

: (7.45)
Vectors ~a; ~d; ~h in (7:42)   (7:44) are the unknown coecients, which are pinned down by
imposing that C^(K;B;  ;~a);  ^ (K;B; ~d) and  ^B(K;B;~h) satisfy the three Euler equations and
the laws of motion at a number of collocation points. The number of collocation points is set
so that the number of equations equals the number of unknown coecients. In our exercise we
choose Chebyshev collocation. It should be noted that the approximation of the debt policy,
equation (7.44), embeds already the approximation of the tax policy in terms of K and B. On
the other hand, the approximation of the consumption function, (7.42), must be done in terms
of K, B and  , in order to obtain the derivatives of the consumption function which show up
in the Generalized Euler equations. Note, however, that we compute the consumption function,
and its derivatives, only along the equilibrium path, i.e., for  =  ^ (K;B). That is, both the
consumption function and its derivatives are computed as functions of K and B.
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Figure 1. Ray of steady states in (τ, B)
B
*
Notes: Figure 1 plots the ray of steady states in the space of taxes and debt levels.
38
Policy Functions
Figure 4. Gov. Expenditure Function
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Figure 5. Consumption Function
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Figure 2. Tax Policy Function
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Figure 3. Debt Policy Function
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Notes: Figures 2 to 5 show policy functions in the Markov-perfect equilibrium generating steady
state [3] in Table 1. The government's tax policy is shown in Figure 2. The government's debt
policy is shown in Figure 3. The government's spending policy is displayed in Figure 4. Finally,
the private consumption function is shown in Figure 5.
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Equilibrium Dynamics
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Figure 8. The K’=K and B’=B Loci
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Figure 6. Net Investment, K’-K
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Figure 7. Change in Public Debt, B’-B
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Notes: Figures 6 to 8 show equilibrium dynamics around steady state [3] in Table 1. Figure 6
shows net investment; Figure 7 shows the change in government debt; and Figure 8 shows the
K 0 = K and B0 = B loci.
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Errors
Figure 11. Generalized Euler Equation 2 Errors
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Figure 9. Euler Equation Errors
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Figure 10. Generalized Euler Equation 1 Errors
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Notes: Figures 9 to 11 show relative errors of Chebyshev collocation for the Euler equation
(Figure 9), and the two Generalized Euler equations for the government (Figures 10 and 11).
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The Value of Period-t Government
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Htau,B’L Steady state tax
and debt issues
Figure 12
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Notes: Figure 12 plots the value of the period-t government at (K; B) |steady state [3] in
Table 1|, as a function of the period-t tax rate and debt issues. Figure 13 is a contour map of
the function in Figure 12. Figure 14 plots the isoline where the value of the period-t government
attains its maximum. The dot in Figure 14 corresponds to the tax rate and debt issues
prescribed by the policies of the Markov-perfect equilibrium generating steady state [3].
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Transitional Dynamics
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Figure 15.  Physical Capital:  Transition from steady state [2] in Table 1 to steady state [3]
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Figure 16. Public Debt:  Transition from steady state [2] in Table 1 to steady state [3]
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Figure 17.  Consumption of Private Good, C
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Figure 18. Consumption of Public Good, G
Notes: Figures 15-18 plot equilibrium dynamics for physical capital, public debt and private
and public consumption from initial conditions (K0; B0) given by steady-state values in column
[2] of Table 1, (the steady state with no distortions) and converging to steady-state [3].
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Figure 19.  Income Tax Rate, τ
Notes: Figure 19 plots the income tax rate along a Markov-perfect equilibrium from initial
conditions (K0; B0) given by steady-state values in column [2] of Table 1, (the steady state with
no distortions) and converging to steady-state values in column [3].
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Figure 20. Welfare at (KRO,BRO) under alternative policies
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Notes: Figure 20 plots welfare at initial conditions (KRO; BRO) |the steady-state values of the
Ramsey outcome| under alternative policies for the period-zero government. The horizontal
line marks the level of welfare of adopting policy rules of the equilibrium with distortions
yielding steady state [3] in Table 1.
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